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Abstract 
 
I investigate the origins of social trust within Vietnam. Combining a unique contemporary survey 
of households with historic data on climate variation, I show that individuals who were heavily 
threatened by negative climate fluctuation exhibit more trust in neighbors and other people in 
close group. The evidence indicates that the effects of climate variation on social trust 
transmitted through strengthening the cooperation among village peasants in coping with risk 
and uncertainty. The results also indicate that households with higher proportion of agricultural 
incomes tend to rely more on village members in the case of emergency. However, the increased 
village relationship does not erode family ties.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The past decade has seen the rapid an increasing consensus among economists that institutions is 
one of the most important deep determinants of economic development and holds the key to 
prevailing patterns of prosperity around the world (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 
2002, Rodrik et al.,2004). This literature usually cites North‟s (1991) definition of institutions as 
being „the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, [they] are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction‟. However, the institutional concepts that are used in 
this literature focus on extensively formal institutions; informal institutions, which North argued 
were more important than formal institutions, only attract attention recently (Jutting et al, 2007; 
Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Several studies seek to examine the role of informal institutions
1
, 
such as social trust, on economic and institutional development through its facilitation of 
cooperation and collective action among the members of a community (Putnam, 1993, 2000; 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). However, far too little attention has been paid to source of 
social trust. 
 
Only recently economists have begun to investigate the origins of social trust and to explain the 
large differences in trust across and within countries. Several studies have revealed that historical 
circumstances, particularly experiences of cooperation or conflict such as the free-city state 
experience in medieval Italy and the slave trade in Africa, can have long lasting effects on the 
level of trust of a community (Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2009). 
Other studies examine the long term impacts of climate volatility on social trust and showing that 
historical variability in climatic conditions affects the evolution of trust and family ties in Europe 
(Durante, 2009). However, cross-country studies may provide limited evidence since too many 
things alter across countries. Therefore, we needs to focus on micro evidence within countries to 
see how different individuals behave, by holding constant all the other characteristics and 
institutions of a country. 
 
                                                          
1
 Culture norms are considered as a part of informal institutions 
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The primary objective of this paper is to complement recent studies that try to understand and 
explain trust origins. Particularly, the paper tries to fill gaps in our knowledge of origins of social 
trust in the context of developing and non-Western societies. Specifically, I examine empirical 
relationships between environmental variation and social capital in the context of Vietnam. 
Vietnam offers an attractive setting within which to study social trust. Unlike many other 
developing countries and transition economies, Vietnam has experienced exceptional per capita 
income growth in the last two decades, accompanied by fundamental but gradual social changes 
without large-scale social or political upheavals. However, the high economic growth cannot 
explain by the quality of formal institutions as Vietnam is ranked at low level in international 
ranking tables such as Polity IV and Governance Indicator. One explanation is weak formal 
institutions are likely to be supplemented by informal institutions. For instance, the World Value 
Surveys show that the Vietnamese national level of social trust appears higher than some other 
East Asian nations at Vietnam's stage of economic development (Dalton and Ngoc, 2005).  
 
I try to examine empirically the hypothesis that development of trust is based on the demand of 
cooperation between peasants to cope with natural climate
2
 fluctuations, which are considered as 
the main risks for agricultural activities (Durant, 2009; Tran, 1997; Rambo, 1979). Durant (2009) 
proposes that peasants in rural and remote regions, in which well-functioning credit and 
insurance markets do not exit, have to rely on different strategies to protect themselves from 
natural shocks. Of which, some strategies are only effective if there are some degree of collective 
effort and involvements of the broader community. For example, as large-scale constructions, 
such as dykes and irrigation systems, have to be built to ease the impacts of hazard environment, 
they require cooperative action among members of the local community. In addition, peasants 
can improve insurance capacity against natural risks by expanding relationship to other member 
in same communes, who are likely to be affected by weather fluctuations in the same ways. 
 
To test our hypothesis, I use data from 2008 Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey to 
investigate whether households living in regions that were heavily affected by climate variability 
                                                          
2 According to World Meteorological Organization, climate in a narrow sense “can be defined as the statistical 
description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time”. 
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in the past are more trusting others people today.  Through combining historical climate data for 
the period 1927-1985 with a contemporary survey data on social capital available from different 
provinces across the country, the analysis confirms that regions with greater intra-annual 
fluctuations in temperature and rainfall have higher levels of interpersonal trust among village 
peasants. This study also indicate that although some can argue that other factors, such as 
genetics or education, play a much larger role in the development of culture, the relationship of 
climate variability and social trust in Vietnam can no longer be ignored. In other words, 
Vietnam‟s climate has played a crucial role in the development of Vietnamese agricultural 
culture and will continue to influence Vietnam‟s in the future.  
 
I also examine whether a more variable environment should increase an individual‟s propensity 
to interact with non-family members and reduce her dependency on the family for insurance 
purposes. If it does, then higher climate variability may make family ties weaker. Numerous 
studies have attempted to explain the existence of a negative relationship between social trust 
and the strength of family ties: the greater the importance of the family to the individual, the less 
their sense of community and civic engagement (for example, Banfield, 1958; Ermisch and 
Gambetta, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Durant, 2009).  
 
Contrary to other studies, such as Durant (2009), the results indicate that more variability in 
rainfall and temperature does not weaken family ties in regions. One explanation is in a 
Confucian country most people consider families as the most important factors and persistent. 
Therefore, this norm is expected to be maintained even people receive less support from their 
relatives. Another alternative explanation for my finding is that family ties and general trust are 
not necessarily substitutes but rather unrelated (or complemented) in Confucian countries.  
 
I then turned to specific mechanisms and examined two explanations for the relationship 
between the climate variation and trust. I found that people living in more climate variation tend 
to ask for the help from their neighbors in the case of emergency, which enhance mutual trust 
among them. In addition, I realized that households who rely more on agricultural incomes tend 
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to trust other people. The explanation is that the living that heavily relies on natural environment 
resulted in continuing cooperation and promoting social networks, and higher trust 
 
The paper has been organized in the following way. I begin in section 2 by describing historical 
and conceptual groundwork. I discuss evidence on the interaction between natural environment 
and cooperation, describe the conceptual framework and illustrate its predictions. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 illustrates the empirical strategy and presents the results obtained 
using historical climate data. Finally, section 5 summarizes the key findings and concludes. 
 
2. Environmental Adaptation, Cooperation and Trust in Rural Regions of Vietnam 
 
A. Historical Background 
 
Vietnam lies between roughly eight and twenty-three degrees north latitudes, which places it 
within the tropical monsoon belt. Due to differences in latitude and uneven topography, 
Vietnam‟s climate conditions are far from uniform with two distinct climatic zones, North and 
South Vietnam (Mark and Nguyen, 2001).  North of Vietnam encompasses the mountainous 
provinces, Red River Delta and a part of central regions of the country. Gourou (1936) divided 
the Red River Delta into eight sub-regions, three of which are the foothills marginal to the plain 
and five of which are within the Delta. Each of these sub-regions represents a variety of relief 
and drainage. The quality of soil is low and varies in structure and type across the region and 
even from village to village. In addition, the Red River Delta is also exposed to high risk of 
being flooded. The coastal central regions can experience heavier rainfall than other areas 
because of typhoons that develop in the South China Sea and move northeast along the coast. 
The typhoons are generally worse along the southern coast, which experiences the most severe 
winds and heaviest rainfall. Vietnam‟s typhoons are most common in July through October. 
Large portions of the coast can experience heavy rainfall throughout the entire year. South 
climate is dominated by dry seasons and wet monsoons and lies in the northern temperate zone; 
therefore, these regions would have been most productive for agriculture purposes. 
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Being a typical agricultural country, people's lives depend much on natural conditions. Resident 
areas are organized into hamlets and villages. Village people have liked to live in big families. 
Compassion and assistance among people are the representation of kin's strength. In a kin, 
everybody is responsible for protecting and assisting each other both material and spirit, guiding 
each others to promote their position in society. Moreover, since the wet rice cultivation requires 
a big labour force, Vietnamese farmers not only bear much but also assist to each others.  In 
order to cope with the social environment, it is necessary to cooperate to make effect. The 
organization basing on this habitat creates democracy and equality between man and man. This 
is regarded to be primary democratic form - village democracy (Rambo, 1979; 2005). However, 
there are fundamental differences in the characteristics of villages and village peasants between 
the North and South
3
. The differences in natural environment help to explain the diversity of 
social organization between northern and southern peasants. While the environment in Mekong 
Delta is homogonous through its surface, the Red River Delta shows a natural diversification. 
 
The Red River with about 1,200 kilometers long has high water volume, which averages 500 
million cubic meters per second, but may increase by more than 60 times at the peak of the rainy 
season. The entire delta region is no more than three meters above sea level, and much of it is 
one meter or less. Moreover, this delta area is subject to erratic but heavy rainfall (Rambo, 1979). 
Such heavy rains are usually associated with the movement of typhoons in the South China Sea 
and hence can occur several times throughout years. Consequently, as rainfall is immediately 
poured in the river regime, the red River can rise to flood levels up to dozen times in a single 
season (Dumong, 1935). Under a natural river regime, almost all the Delta would be subject to 
annual flooding and hence would not be usable for rice cultivation (Gourou, 1936). Therefore, 
large-scale constructions, such as dykes and irrigation systems, have to be built and maintained 
to ease the impacts of hazard environment and to irrigate the rich rice-growing delta. Each 
village takes its responsibility of the supervision of the dykes within its territory and all village 
members were liable to perform unpaid labor to repair the dykes (Cima, 1987; Rambo, 2005). 
 
                                                          
3
 The southern Vietnamese peasants originated from the north and gradually migrated southward in the process of 
advancing to the south. 
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The threat of losses of crop to natural disasters and disease contribute to the adaptive values of 
various risk spreading social institutions which characterize Northern peasant society. Village 
communal granaries provide a reserve food supply in case of serious loss. The division of fields 
into tiny plots and the custom of family owning several widely dispersed fields would also tend 
to reduce the risk of a household losing its entire crop to any particular pest or disease.  
 
The northern peasants live in densely settled villages that surrounded by thick bamboo hedges. 
Outsiders were not permitted to stay in the village after nightfall. Villages were largely 
endogamous and in-migration rare. Outsiders who were allowed to settle in a village had to wait 
three generations before becoming full members of the community. Each village was an 
autonomous self-governing community.   
 
Subject to irregular weather patterns with their typhoons, floods and drought and a distressing 
frequency of emergencies, the early settlers of the Red River Delta developed a distinctive social 
attitude that became an intrinsic part of their culture. There are many solutions to the problems of 
making a living and dealing with natural disasters and other misfortunes which require a 
collective effort that individual interests became subordinate to those of the group. Rather than 
rugged individualism and self-reliance, the emerging culture placed high value on cultivating 
relationship within the group, particularly the village, the extended kin group and the family 
(James, 2005).  
 
Although Southern villages had originally shared the same form of social organization as their 
northern ancestors, they had evolved their open settlement pattern in the Mekong Delta with its 
much more benign natural and social environment. Contrary to Northern environment, the 
average annual rainfall in Mekong Delta is just adequate to satisfy the requirements for rice 
growing. Unlike the case of Read River Delta, there is relatively little variation from year to year 
in the quantity of rainfall in the South and consequently crops rather suffer there for lack of 
water (Great Britain, 1943). The habitat was essentially benign, offering no major hazard to 
peasant cultivation and thus requiring no corporately organized protective responses such as the 
flood control dykes of the North (Rambo, 2005). Therefore, the peasant settlements in the South 
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were very different from the northern ones. In fact, they were not villages in the conventional 
senses. There was no bamboo hedge to physically define the boundaries of the village, no gate 
and control on entry. Individual households were widely dispersed along the banks of the canals 
that cross the delta. Although these settlements were organized by the state into villages and 
hamlets, these administrative units were not true communities. Household often had closer social 
relations with neighbors living directly across the canal from them, even they were actually 
residents of different villages than they did with people living far down the canal in their own 
village (Rambo, 2005). Southern peasant society does not appear to have become adapted to the 
threat of crop loss at the village level of integration although the share cropping system which 
predominates in the Mekong Delta provides a certain amount of protection to the tenant farmers 
against crop losses, both because it is customary for the landowner to reduce rents in the event of 
a poor harvest (Hendry, 1964). 
 
B. Conceptual Framework 
 
There are two mechanisms that climate variation is likely to impact on trust. The first mechanism 
is that the difficult natural environment creates favorable conditions for cooperation. Some 
author seek to explain development of trust based on the demand of cooperation between 
peasants to cope with natural weather fluctuations, which are considered as the main risks for 
agricultural activities (Durant, 2009; Tran, 1997; Rambo, 1979). Durant (2009) proposes that 
peasants in rural and remote regions, in which well-functioning credit and insurance markets do 
not exit, have to rely on different strategies to protect themselves from natural shocks. Of which, 
some strategies are only effective if there are some degree of collective effort and involvements 
of the broader community. For example, as large-scale constructions, such as dykes and 
irrigation systems, have to be built to ease the impacts of hazard environment, they require 
cooperative action among members of the local community. In addition, peasants can improve 
insurance capacity against natural risks by expanding relationship to other member in same 
communes, who are likely to be affected by weather fluctuations in the same ways. 
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Rambo (1979) demonstrate that the peasant society in the high risk environment has evolved a 
series of institutions which serve to reduce individual insecurity by spreading risk-taking over 
group larger than the nuclear family such as extended family, the lineage and the corporate 
community. As village members select to cooperate with other members, it makes them taking 
more risks in trusting other members. As Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) suggest, interacting 
more with other peoples can lead to more “outward exposure”, and improve their ability to trust 
other people by (1) estimating more accurately the probability of trustworthiness; or (2) reading 
the signs of untrustworthiness more precisely. Therefore, peasants cooperate and interact less 
with other people will exhibit a lower level of trust in members in villages. 
 
The second potential channel of trust is from cultural norms. Although natural uncertainty is 
becoming less profound impacts on agricultural activities, the cooperative and trustworthy 
culture is expected to be maintained. A number of recent papers show that trust attitudes, like 
other cultural traits, can persist for surprisingly long periods of time  and are transmitted from 
generation to generation (for example, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Guiso et al., 2008, Tabellini, 
2008; Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007). A recent study by Guiso et al. (2008) shows that 
parents can transmit their prior trustworthiness to their children. In another cross- and within-
country study, Bjørnskov (2007) finds that trust scores are remarkably stable over several 
decades. At the individual level, this persistence is generally attributed to intergenerational 
transmission operating through genetics, imitation, or deliberate inculcation by parents. This 
view is consistent with recent empirical findings documenting the existence of a strong 
correlation in the propensity to trust between parents and children (Katz and Rotter, 1969; 
Dohmen et al., 2008) and between second-generation immigrants and current inhabitants of the 
country of origin (Guiso et al., 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2007). 
 
3. Data Sources and Description 
 
Social Trust 
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I employ Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS)
4
 in 2008 to inspect the 
impacts of climate volatility on social trust in different parts of the empirical analysis.  
 
VARHSs are uniquely representative surveys which are based on interviews of a random sample 
of 3,223 households in rural regions. The surveys cover rural areas of 12 provinces in Vietnam, 
including: Ha Tay, Lao Cai, Phu Tho, Dien Bien and Lai Chau in the North; Nghe An in the 
North central Coast; Quang Nam and Khanh Hoa in the South Central Coast; Dak Lak, Dak 
Nong and Lam Dong in the Central Highland and Long An in the Mekong River Delta. The 
surveys provide rich information on a broad range of topics, such as rural employment, on- and 
off-farm income generating activities, rural enterprises, property rights, savings, investment, 
insurance and participation in formal and informal social networks. The visual location 
distribution of current respondents has been represented in Figure 1. The summary statistics of 
our analysis sample are presented in Table 1. As shown by the Figure 1, a lot respondents live in 
remote and mountainous areas, with about 17 percent of them are minority. 
 
The survey asks a standard question about self-reported trust. The exact wording of the question 
is as follows: “Most people are generally honest and can be trusted or In this commune one has 
to be careful, there are people you cannot trust?”  Respondents could either agree or disagree. 
They also had the option of answering that they “do not know”. Removing respondents with no 
answer leaves us with 2220 and 1846 potential observations for the two questions. 
 
Since respondents‟ answers to the trust questions are binary, there are a number of possible 
estimation strategies. The first is constructing a measure of trust that takes on the binary value of 
0 and 1: 0 corresponds to the response “Disagree”; and 1 to the response “Agree” then using 
OLS to estimate linear probability model. Another strategy is to instead estimate a logit model. 
                                                          
4 The survey data used in this analysis is taken from the third round of the VARHS, which was conducted in 2008 
by Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA) under the technical support from Department of Economics (DoE) at the University of Copenhagen. All 
rural households in 12 provinces interviewed for the 2004 Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey has been 
resurveyed. The data are publicly available and can be downloaded at: http://www.econ.ku.dk/derg/links/vietnam/ 
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As we shown in Appendix, the estimates are qualitatively identical if we pursue this alternative 
strategy. 
 
People suspect that this kind of question is unlikely to capture individual trust attitudes (Durant, 
2009). For example, some have argued that this question is a relatively ambiguous in that it does 
not explicitly specify the object of the respondent‟s trust. Moreover, the question does not 
provide an exact answer whether this is generalized or particular trust. 
 
Particular trust refers to those cases in which individuals trust members of a narrow circle of 
family members or close friends, but do not trust (and do not expect to be trusted by) people 
outside of it. In contrast, generalized trust is the trust that a given person has toward a member of 
a broader community. The first question basically asks about general trust. However, since a lot 
people in same village or commune have close relationship, such as kin or relatives, respondents 
are likely to apply instead to particular trust. Therefore, this dataset is used to investigate the 
impacts of environmental adaptation on trust among village members (or particular trust). 
 
The distributions of responses for question on social trust are summarized in Table 2. A number 
of characteristics of the responses are notable. The share of respondents who agree with the 
statement "most people are generally honest and can be trusted” is more than 90 percent. The 
results are consistent with those reported in Dalton et. al. (2002), which show that the 
Vietnamese exhibit high levels of trust, compared with other countries surveyed under the World 
Values Survey project. 
 
Family ties 
 
The importance of family is a historic aspect of Vietnamese society, as with many Confucian 
societies in East Asia. The family is a basis of economic organization in an agrarian economy, 
the role of the father and parents in general is reinforced by cultural traditions, and family 
relations provide a general model for authority relations (Pham, 1999). Through history and 
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changes in political and social regimes, the centrality of the family appears to be an enduring 
feature of Vietnamese society (Dalton et al, 2003). 
 
To investigate the impact of climate variation on family ties, I use information about households 
who reported having helpers. The survey asks respondents to provide information about people 
who are a source of help in case of emergency. People can list the name of up to three people 
from whom they asked for a help. The exact question is “If you were in need of money in case of 
an emergency who outside of your household could you turn to who would be willing to provide 
this assistance?” In addition, the survey includes another question about how relationship of 
these people with household: (1) Relative; (2) Friend; (3) Neighbor; or (4) Other. The survey 
also provides information whether these people in the same village or not. 
 
I classify whether household mainly asking for help from relatives rather others (friend and 
neighbors) if all people in the asking lists are relatives. Relatives can be people who live outside 
villages. Column 2 in Table 3 shows that 64 percent of the helpers mentioned are relatives of the 
respondents. The results on the share of helpers who are relatives are interesting. They show that 
households in the more developed provinces (e.g Ha Tay, Phu Tho or Long An) are at least as 
likely as households in less developed provinces (e.g. Lai Chau, Dak Nong) to mention relatives 
as their most important helpers. This similarity in level of family ties is a first indication of 
important trend: whereas economic development has tended to erode the relative economic 
importance of family ties in Western countries, this may not necessarily be happening in 
Vietnam. Similar conclusions are reached by Dalton et. al. (2002), who in a sample that includes 
both rural and urban dwellers find that the importance of family ties does not decline with 
socioeconomic status. In the language of social capital theory, Vietnamese families display high 
levels of “bonding” social capital, and this “traditional” form of social capital does not appear to 
be crowded out by more modern types of social relations (CIEM et at, 2007).  
 
Climate Variables 
 
A. Rainfall and Temperature  
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With regard to climate variables, I restrict my attention to temperature and rainfall. These two 
variables have a considerable impact on wet-rice agriculture and other natural resource-
dependent activities, are highly correlated with other important factors such as storms, typhoon, 
cyclones and drought. Of course, these indicators do not represent a comprehensive catalog of 
the physical and biotic components of the Vietnamese habitat. However, they include main 
factors that empirically affect the natural adaptation and livelihood strategies of Vietnamese 
peasants throughout the country. 
 
Data on climate variability from 46 climate stations comes from Institute of Meteorology and 
Hydrology and prolongs 35 – 70 years from 1927 to 1985. These stations are allocated evenly 
among national geography.  For each station, I have climate data, such as rainfall, at station with 
latitude-longitude degree point p in district i during month m of year t is denoted as Rpimt. Then, 
measures of inter-annual climate variability from the monthly data have been constructed within 
each station. To obtain a compound measure of within year variability of climate for station, I 
average the proxies of climate over years for twelve months. And then for each month, I compute 
the standard deviation over the other months, which measures the month-specific variability of in 
each station. For districts without climate stations, the weather condition is assumed to be similar 
to other districts with the same latitude. The reason to apply this strategy is that stations are 
expected to gauge the significant climate variation in different regions. Therefore, climate data 
from one station can be used to measure neighboring districts with similar condition.  
 
B. Other geographical variables 
 
Other factors and geographical conditions may have impacts on the evolution of cooperation and 
the appearance of trust among village members. At the same time, they may correlate with 
climate variation. 
 
Average climate conditions  
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Average climatic conditions are likely to have considerable impact on patterns of cooperative 
behavior. For example, even a region without much climate variation but low average rainfall or 
temperature within a year also makes people come up with differences of livelihood strategies. 
To account for these effects, I control for the average level of temperature and rainfall at the 
district level. These measures are constructed from the same dataset described above, taking their 
average over twelve months and over the entire period. 
 
Elevation and Land Terrain 
 
Elevation and land terrain can have both direct and indirect effects on patterns of human 
interaction and on economic outcomes (Nunn et al., 2009). Land terrain and elevation can also be 
expected to be correlated with climate variability. For example, the presence of a mountain can 
lead to different climatic condition and micro-ecosystems on each side (Durant, 2009). This 
requires village members to come up with different cooperative strategies. To control for the 
relationship between climate variability and topography, I include a regional dummy variable to 
measure of land terrain in regressions. The information for land terrain is withdrawn from the 
question: “In general, what is the slope of this plot? Flat, Slight Slope, Moderate Slope and Steep 
Slope” The measure of land slope takes the value of 1 if plots are flat and 0 otherwise. As 
presented in Table 1, more than 60 percent of land plots are in slight to steep conditions. 
 
Land area and quality 
 
Diversification in land quality may have significant impacts on productivity and village 
members‟ motivation to cooperate in agricultural activities (Durant, 2009). To account for this 
aspect, I include area of land and dummy of land quality in regressions. Information on the land 
quality is taken from the question: “Do you experience problems with any of following conditions 
on this plot? Erosion, Dry land, Low-lying land, Sedimentation, Landslide, Stone soils/clay, 
other or No problem” I construct a measure of land quality that takes on the value of 1 if plots 
does not suffer any above problems and 0 otherwise. 
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C. Migration  
 
Although the survey has many important advantages, the data also have some shortcomings. The 
survey has only limited information on migration but we would ideally like to know precisely 
when and where an individual move (from one district to other districts). This is because our 
analysis exploits geographic and environment variation to study the impact on social trust. 
Moreover, the migration is likely to make the regression coefficient biased in the way that people 
could be selective to choose living in one region rather than others and these people are likely to 
be more (or less) trusting people. 
 
 Fortunately, the survey provides information on location that people born. Therefore, I take only 
households with head, spouse or both of them where they live are also where they were born. 
The argument here is the more time those people live in this environment, the more their culture 
adapt to this natural condition.  
 
The control of location that people were born may mitigate the possibility of selection bias. In 
addition, other reasons that make migration less likely to be major issues. First, since most of 
provinces are poor and low developed, it provides less incentive to people from one province in 
the sample migrate to others. Second, it also reduces the possibility that people from other 
provinces move to live in any provinces in the sample.  
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
A. OLS estimates 
 
I first investigate the relationship between climate variability and trust using historical climate 
data. To further test the robustness of the relationship between trust and historical climate 
variability, I extend the analysis to account for differential geographical and social network 
variables.  
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My empirical strategy can be summarized by the following estimating equation
5
: 
 
pdicdididppdi XVarEnvironTrust ,,
'
,
'
,,, _    
 
where αp denotes province fixed effects, which are included to capture provinces specific factors, 
such as effectiveness of local regulations and norms, that may affect trust. The variable pciTrust ,,  
denotes measures of trust, which vary across households. cVarEnviron_  denotes the degree of  
variability for climate (temperature or rainfall) among districts. β is our coefficient of interest 
which estimates the relationship between the environmental variation in a district and the 
individual‟s current level of trust. 
 
To assess the potential effects of environmental variation on this social trust, it may necessary to 
examine whether these patterns vary systematically across demographic groups. For example, if 
there are systematic differences by income and education levels, then we might speculate that 
rising social status might shift patterns of social trust in predictable ways. Higher levels of 
income is expected to increase involvement in social networks; family activity is will be higher 
among the better educated, as well as participation in work and friendship networks. We also 
might hypothesize that younger Vietnamese might place less reliance on family ties, and be more 
integrated to work and friendship networks and less social trust. Occupation may be an important 
determinant of social trust in the sense that people who work in more competitive sectors have 
higher levels of trust (Francois et al, 2010). Similarly, we expect that farmers would follow more 
family-center patterns of social relations than urban workers. 
 
 The vector 
'
,, pdi  include information on household head, such as age, age squared/100, years of 
education, household income, a gender variable indicator, an indicator variable that equals one if 
                                                          
5 Sampling weights are applied in all calculations to ensure unbiased estimates of population parameters. The 
weights for each household are, approximately, the inverse of the probability that the household was surveyed for 
the 2004 VHLSS. Because the distribution of the rainfall and temperature are highly left skewed, with a small 
number of observations taking on large values, I report estimates using the natural log of the climate measures 
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the respondent lives in an urban location, a dummy variable for people who are ethnic minorities 
and sixty one occupational fixed effects. The vector 
'
,di  consists of geographical and social 
network variables, such as average temperature and rainfall, land terrain and quality, set of 15 
group member indicators, an indicator of whether people always attend meeting. c is a variable 
designed to capture the share of the commune‟s population that is of the same ethnicity as the 
respondent.  
 
Many of the explanatory variables in above equation do not vary across individuals, rather at the 
district level. For example, climate variation will have the similar effects for people living the 
same district. Given the potential for within-group correlation of the residuals, I adjust all 
standard errors for potentially arbitrary correlation between households in the same district. 
 
Table 6 and 7 reports the results using for log of rainfall and temperature variation. In baseline 
models, I find substantial evidence that climate variation, particularly temperature variability, is 
correlated with two self-reported trust indicators. In the most case, with and without provincial 
fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for temperature, β, is positive and statistically significant 
(at the 5% level), indicating that climate variability positively affecting average trust score at 
household level. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the weather positively affected 
individuals‟ trust of those around them. However, the evidence is not quite clear for the case of 
rainfall variation. The significant relationships disappear as I control for provincial fixed effects. 
 
Realizing the potential problem is that climate variation may pick up the effects of other 
geographical variables, in Table 8, I include the vector of geographic controls, which includes 
average temperature and rainfall, land area, land terrain and quality. When the geographical 
controls are included, the point estimates of the coefficients of interest increase substantially and 
become highly statistically significant. For the magnitude of the coefficient, holding other 
variables constant, one standard deviation increase in temperature corresponds to a .023 increase 
in probability of trust other people (nearly 9 percent standard deviation increase in trust).  
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I perform a variety of robustness checks for the results. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find 
evidence in the US that when respondents are part of an ethnic minority they exhibit low trust. 
However, religious belief and ethnic origin does not affect trust. In other studies, some authors 
argue that religion can affect trust directly, especially within religious communities, by 
promoting it via ritual (Iannaccone, 1998) or indirectly through psychological effects (Tan and 
Vogel, 2005). They find that trustworthiness increases with religiosity and more religious 
trustees are trustworthier. Participation in associations is also mater because it can affect social 
trust through repeated interactions. In addition, participation in social groups can enhance trust as 
social networks of the form created by social groups provide a mechanism to enforce agreements 
among network members (Kandori 1992; Mobius and Szeidl 2007). To control for all these 
factors, I add dummy variables to indicate whether people belong to social and religious groups 
and how frequent they attend meetings. 
 
Putnam (2000) shows how changes in work, family structure, age, suburban life, television, 
computers and women's roles have contributed to the decline in stock of social capital. Olken 
(2009) also finds that the more village members spend on watching television and listening to the 
radio, the less they participate in social organizations and lower they self-report trust
6
. I control 
for hours of watching TV. 
 
The results suggest that households with head member who belong to religious group (see Table 
9) are less trustworthy than non-religious people. The coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant (at the 5 percent level). This seems inconsistent with the view that group activities 
increase trust. However, due to limited number of people belonging to religious group (less than 
one percent), then the results become uninformative. Other social network variables such as 
always attend meeting and hours watching TV do not show significant effects on social trust. 
 
I undertake a number of other sensitivity checks. First, I separately investigate the impacts of 
climate variation for each gender group of population. The results are more robust to the male 
                                                          
6 To save space, I do not report the coefficient estimates of the control variables throughout the paper. 
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subsample. I find that temperature variation (last Column in Table 11 and 12) has higher impacts 
on female; however, the results are not obvious for rainfall variation. Second, I check for 
robustness to alternative estimation methods. Using a logit model produces estimates that are 
qualitatively identical to our baseline OLS estimates (Appendix II). Third, I alternatively exclude 
different regions to see the impacts of other potential geographical factors, such as landlocked or 
near big rivers can make the results change significantly. The results in Table 13 and 14 indicate 
that the estimates are quite stable over a range of regression, except as the Northwest region is 
excluded. A plausible interpretation is that the impacts of climate variation are more profound in 
mountainous and remote areas. 
 
B. Possible endogeneity problems 
 
The use of a rich set of individual characteristics and district controls, and the fact that the 
climate volatility measures predate the outcomes, reduce concerns about omitted variable bias 
and endogeneity. However, it is important to admit that I cannot definitively exclude the 
possibility that some unobserved district characteristic affects both climate variation and social 
trust, leading to spurious results. Other problems also may create biased estimation. 
 
First, OLS estimator would yield biased and inconsistent estimates since our proxy measure of 
climate variation, i.e. rainfall and temperature, would be correlated with the error term in the 
social trust equation. This problem results in an attenuation bias in the estimated climate 
variation on social trust. 
 
Another problem that may affect the estimates is measurement bias. The problem happens as a 
non-random subgroup of village peasants select to stay in regions even with more natural risks. 
The reason may be due to constrained resources that make them less opportunity to move to 
other regions with better natural environments. People with less ability are also likely to choose 
not moving out of villages. These groups of people are likely to have different patterns of social 
trust. I assume that these village peasants have less interaction with outside society and less trust 
other people (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010), then the measurement error in self-reported trust, to 
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whatever reasons, may correlate with the climate variation term in the right hand side. Another 
selection problem can be raised due to unobservable individual characteristics. Some groups of 
village peasants are likely to be more risk-averse or less motivation and tend to stay at the same 
place where they were born even those places are not favorable for living. If risk-averse people 
are less trusting others and these factors correlate with climate variability among district, then the 
estimates are also to be underestimated. However, I expect this effect would be small. 
 
C. Sensitivity Test for Unobservable Bias 
 
As mentioned above, although I try to control for observable factors, such as individual controls 
and other geographical variables, the estimates reported in Table 6 and 7 may still be biased by 
unobservable factors correlated with selection into the climate variations and social trust.  
 
In this part, I assess the likelihood that the estimates are biased by unobservables. I follow the 
approach initiated by Altonji et al. (2005) and Bellows and Miguel (2008) that selection on 
observables can be used to assess the potential bias from unobservables. Their ideas are to 
measure the strength of the likely bias arising from unobservables. In another word, how much 
higher selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, must be to explain away 
the full estimated effect (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2009). Specifically, to gauge this bias, the ratio 
of the estimated coefficient for the variable of interest from the unrestricted regression over the 
difference between the estimated coefficient for the variable of interest from the restricted and 
unrestricted regression is calculated. Then, the higher this ratio, the greater is the effect that 
needs to be explained away by selection on unobservables. 
 
I consider two sets of restricted control variables: one with average rainfall and temperature 
controls and another with a group of individual controls that includes only age, age squared, and 
married, gender and average rainfall and temperature variables. I also consider two sets of full 
covariates: the baseline group of controls from equation Table 8, and a second with geographic 
and social network control variables in Table 9. 
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Given our two restricted and two unrestricted sets of covariates, there are four combinations of 
restricted and unrestricted controls that can be used to calculate the ratios. The ratios, for each of 
two measures of trust, are reported in Appendix II.3. 
 
Of the sixteen ratios are reported in Appendix II.3, none are less than one. The ratios range from 
10.2 to 17685, with a median ratio of 11.7. Therefore, to attribute the entire OLS estimate to 
selection effects, selection on unobservables would have to be nearly two times greater than 
selection on observables, and on average, over 33 times greater. In my view, these results make it 
less likely that the estimated effect of the rainfall variation is completely driven by 
unobservables. 
 
D. Exploration of Mechanisms 
 
To test the empirical validity of my theoretical channels, I now look at the relationship between 
climate volatility and the importance of the family and relationship among village members, 
replicating the analysis performed in the previous section. 
 
Subsistence peasants often lack savings to self-insure themselves against adverse income shocks. 
In addition, they are likely to suffer credit-constrain since the high transaction costs of providing 
small credit prevent credit organizations from entering the market. Therefore, through social 
networks, they can access an important source of small credit that helps to improve efficient risk-
sharing within the community.  
 
The hypothesis here is in the process of environmental adaptation, village peasants have to 
cooperate with each other to deal with natural turbulences and disasters. This promotes trust and 
social networks among members in the village. Therefore, village peasants rely more on other 
members in the facing of emergency. In contrast, social networks also strengthen trust between 
peasants because they allow their members to get more information about each other through 
repeated interaction. This allows potential lenders to identify reliable borrowers. Social networks 
enable lenders to control the actions of borrowers to some degree and, for example, discourage 
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excessively risky investments through a system of punishments and rewards. I will investigate a 
channel through which climate variation will enhance the relationship among communal 
members. I expect that district with high level of weather variation will make lenders willing to 
provide loans to other members of the community. At the same time, borrowers also are likely to 
ask for more help from neighbors, regardless of whether they are close family members. This 
channel is described in the graph below. 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 14, I examine the effects of the frequency of climate varibility on enhancing 
cooperation and relationship among neighbours. All regressions include both provincial fixed 
effects and geographical controls. In column 1, I start regressing the first village ties on 
variability in rainfall. The coefficient on rainfall variability is positive but statistically 
insignificant. Because the question about asking for help does not mention specific reasons for 
borrowing money, the results are likely to be contaminated by other factors beyond climate 
variation. To overcome this, I gradually exclude some regions in the South with less climate 
variation to figure out the effects more precisely. Column (3)-(5) indicate that climate variation 
strengthen relationship among village members. 
 
In addition, in order to investigate the impacts of income sources on cooperation, I decompose 
household income into different components: incomes from agricultural and common resource 
activities and incomes from non-farm activities. If main source of income of village peasants 
from agricultural and related activities, I expect that people with higher share of agricultural 
incomes will ask for help from other village members more. 
 
The coefficients in Column 1 to 5 are significant at 10% level and quite are stable across models. 
The results show agricultural incomes have a significantly positive effect on villagers‟ 
relationship. The point estimate indicates that one percentage increase in agricultural income 
Environmental  
Adaptation 
Cooperation to cope 
with risk and 
uncertainty 
Asking for help 
in the case of 
emergency 
Social trust 
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increase the probability of cooperation (asking for help) to village neighbors from 0.13 to 0.15 
(or 30 percent of standard deviation).  
 
I also test the possibility that increased relying on other people in the same villages will reduce 
the family ties. Empirical evidence suggests that these two objects are negatively correlated. 
Using survey data from multiple sources Alesina and Giuliano (2010) find that individuals with 
strong family ties display lower levels of general trust, civic engagement and political 
participation. Durant (2009) discovered that climate adaptation has tended to erode the relative 
economic importance of family ties in Western countries. 
 
Table 15 reports regression results for the effects of the frequency of climate variation on family 
ties. Family ties are proxied by the whether village members ask their relatives for money in case 
of emergency. In column 1, I start by regressing the first family ties on variability in rainfall. The 
coefficient on rainfall variability is positive but statistically insignificant. Following the above 
strategy, I exclude regions with less climate variation, such as Mekong River Delta, to figure out 
more precisely the effects. The result from Column 2 to 5 indicate the same pattern, climate 
variation does not erode family and relative ties. In other words, this shows that people living in 
unfavorable conditions still rely on family and relatives in the case of assistance. These results 
contradict with other research that family ties tend to be deteriorated as people are more general 
trust. However, this may not necessarily be happening in Vietnam. Similar conclusions are 
reached by Dalton et. al. (2002), who in a sample that includes both rural and urban dwellers 
finds that the importance of family ties does not decline with socioeconomic status. Vietnamese 
families display high levels of “bonding” social capital, and this “traditional” form of social 
capital does not appear to be crowded out by more modern types of social relations. One possible 
explanation of this pattern is the continued importance of Confucian values, along with living in 
difficult environments, which tend to strengthen family relations.  
 
I continue the investigation of mechanism by decomposing the total income by household in 
farming and non-farming sources. I expect that people in household with higher share of income 
from farming activities will expose higher social trust to other people. Table 16 report OLS 
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regressions for the impact of household incomes from farming activities. In all regressions, the 
coefficients of share of incomes from agricultural activities are positive and significant effects on 
social, but the coefficient on the incomes from non-farm activities not significant. In other 
words, as household incomes are rely more on agricultural activities, people tend to be more 
cooperative and trust other people more. This is very much consistent with our story. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite its importance to economic development, the economic sources of social trust remain 
relatively unexplored. This paper adds to a new and growing literature in economics that seeks to 
better understand the role of environmental variation on cooperation and social trust of village 
peasants.  
 
I have shown that the levels of trust among village peasants can be traced back to the effects of 
historical climate variation. Individuals‟ trust in their neighbors is higher if their livings were 
heavily affected by the natural disasters. To check the robustness of this causal relationship, I 
pursued a number of different strategies. First, I controlled for potential observable 
characteristics that may correlate with natural environment and affects social trust. Second, I 
controlled for district fixed effects that are expected to wipe out confounding effect caused by 
invariant unobserved variables. In general, the estimates show a positive effect of social trust on 
mutual assistance within village members. Third, using recently developed techniques from 
Altonji et al. (2005), I showed that on average selection based on unobservable variables would 
have to be 33 times greater than selection on observables in order for the effect of the rainfall and 
temperature variation on social trust to be completely spurious. 
 
I further examine the relationship between climatic variability and individuals‟ behavior to their 
family in the case of emergency. Contrary with recent studies documenting the existence of a 
negative empirical relationship between trust within and outside the family, I find that higher 
variability in climate does not significantly impacts on family ties.  
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I then turned to specific mechanisms and examined two explanations for the relationship 
between the climate variation and trust. I found that people living in more climate variation tend 
to ask for the help from their neighbors in the case of emergency, which enhance mutual trust 
among them. In addition, I realized that households who rely more on agricultural incomes tend 
to trust other people more. The explanation is that the living that heavily relies on natural 
environment resulted in continuing cooperation and promoting social networks, and higher trust. 
The findings provide another evidence for the importance of natural environment to economic 
development through the evolution of cultural norms. 
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Appendix I 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Most people can be trusted 2220 0.93 0.26 0 1 
Careful in dealing with people 1846 0.78 0.41 0 1 
      Log Rainfall variation (mm) 2317 4.85 0.17 4.57 5.71 
Log Temperature variation (oC) 2317 0.58 0.49 -0.12 1.61 
Average Rainfall 12 months (mm) 2317 151.96 36.78 113.24 320.07 
Average Temperature 12 months (oC) 2317 24.45 2.15 18.31 27.36 
      Age of head 2349 50.07 14.22 16 105 
Age of head, squared/100 2349 27.09 15.70 2.56 110.25 
Year of schooling of head 2349 7.84 3.31 1 13 
Gender (Male:=1) 2349 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Married 2349 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Rural 2349 0.99 0.11 0 1 
Minority 2349 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Log Household income (mil VND) 2349 3.35 0.88 -0.12 7.02 
      Area of land (1000m2) 2349 0.82 1.51 0 30 
Land terrain (Flat:=1) 2349 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Land Quality (Good:=1) 2349 0.60 0.49 0 1 
      Member of social and religious groups 1833 5.51 4.23 1 15 
Attend meeting frequently 1833 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Hours of watching TV 2349 1.71 0.94 0 5 
Share of minority by district 2349 0.14 0.33 0 1 
      Borrowing from same village 2066 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Borrowing from relatives 2066 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Note: The summary statistics are not weighted by population and calculated based on VARHS survey data. 
Table 2. Bivariate correlation 
 Most people 
can be trusted 
Careful in dealing 
with people 
Log Rainfall  
Variation 
Log Temperature 
Variation 
Most people can be trusted 1    
Careful in dealing with people -0.166* 1   
Log Rainfall  Variation 0.119* -0.170* 1  
Log Temperature Variation 0.145* -0.115* 0.140* 1 
Note: * Statistically significant at 5 percent. 
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 Figure 1. Map showing the current locations of respondents 
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Table 3. Climate variation summary (Standard Deviation) 
Province Station Period Rainfall Temperature Province Station Period Rainfall Temperature 
HaTay Son Tay 1958-85 123.72 4.80 DienBien Tua Chua 1968-85 134.40 3.59 
 
Ba Vi 1970-85 147.43 4.89 
 
Tuan Giao 1961-85 111.30 4.06 
 
Ha Dong 1973-85 97.54 4.99 
 
Pha Din 1964-85 126.44 3.35 
 
Xuan Mai 1961-85 130.51 
  
Dien Bien 1967-85 120.76 3.91 
 
My Duc 1962-85 126.82 4.73 Nghe An Quy Chau 1962-85 122.17 4.24 
LaoCai Muong Khuong 1961-78 128.85 4.78 
 
Quy Hop 1968-85 111.23 4.35 
 
Bac Ha 1961-85 122.96 4.83 
 
Tay Hieu 1960-85 116.39 4.48 
 
Lao Cai 1989-1950; 56-78 112.28 4.49 
 
Tuong Duong 1961-85 84.73 4.00 
 
Sa Pa 1929-45; 57-85 158.27 4.21 
 
Quynh Luu 1961-85 137.96 4.60 
Phu Tho Phu Ho 1928-43; 62-85 122.68 4.75 
 
Con Cuong 1961-85 116.69 4.33 
 
Viet Tri 1961-85 109.81 4.83 
 
Do Luong 1961-85 121.01 4.37 
 
Thanh Son 1971-81 109.79 4.64 
 
Hon Ngu 1961-85 170.76 4.67 
 
Minh Dai 1972-85 105.61 4.75 
 
Vinh 1904-46; 56-85 148.36 4.53 
Lai Chau Phong Tho 1961-78 152.11 4.15 Quang Nam Tam Ky 1979-85 236.43 2.85 
 
Tam Duong 1973-85 178.01 3.79 
 
Tra My 1974; 78-85 303.17 2.55 
 
Muong Te 1961-85 208.08 3.80 Khanh Hoa Nha Trang 1907-44; 47-85 120.87 1.79 
 
Sin Ho 1961-85 200.84 3.84 
 
Cam Ranh 1978-85 117.12 1.76 
 
Binh Lu 1968-81 180.89 4.04 
 
Truong Sa 1977-85 135.54 0.96 
 
Lai Chau 1928-44;55-85 159.77 3.73 Dac Lac Buon Ho 1982-1985 101.70 1.92 
Dac Nong Dac Nong 1978-85 164.84 1.27 
 
Buon Ma Thuot 1828-44; 54-74; 78-85 118.17 1.61 
Lam Dong Da Lat 1928-44; 60-69; 78-85 99.98 1.06 
 
M Drack 1977-85 157.39 2.26 
 
Bao Loc 1962-85 135.32 1.06 Long An Moc Hoa 1973-85 96.80 0.88 
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Table 4. Overview of the responses to trust question (percentage) 
Provinces Most people can be trusted Careful in dealing with people 
 
Yes No Yes No 
Ha Tay 91.76 8.24 79.51 20.49 
Lao Cai 97.69 2.31 39.9 60.1 
Phu Tho 95.20 4.80 97.66 2.34 
Lai Chau 95.72 4.28 12.89 87.11 
Dien Bien 81.36 18.64 90.91 9.09 
Nghe An 96.52 3.48 80.17 19.83 
Quang Nam 97.72 2.28 76.61 23.39 
Lam Dong 93.72 6.28 16.09 83.91 
Dac Lac 92.27 7.73 84.39 15.61 
Dac Nong 95.30 4.70 61.53 38.47 
Khanh Hoa 87.42 12.58 89.24 10.76 
Long An 83.36 16.64 83.58 16.42 
 
  
  
Total 92.56 7.44 78.44 21.56 
Note: The summary statistics are not weighted by population and calculated based on VARHS survey data 
 
Table 5. Overview of the asking for help in the case of emergency (percentage) 
Provinces Borrowing from relatives Borrowing from village members 
 
Yes No Yes No 
Ha Tay 68.26 31.74 70.79 29.21 
Lao Cai 58.21 41.79 82.57 17.43 
Phu Tho 57.36 42.64 66.75 33.25 
Lai Chau 62.71 37.29 90.35 9.65 
Dien Bien 78.19 21.81 74.86 25.14 
Nghe An 54.53 45.47 48.58 51.42 
Quang Nam 43.93 56.07 66.27 33.73 
Lam Dong 83.74 16.26 65.95 34.05 
Dac Lac 40.73 59.27 61.6 38.4 
Dac Nong 63.3 36.7 67.23 32.77 
Khanh Hoa 37.71 62.29 61.49 38.51 
Long An 58.98 41.02 58.48 41.52 
   
  
Total 58.87 41.13 65.46 34.54 
Note: The summary statistics are not weighted by population and calculated based on VARHS survey data
 34 
 
Table 6. Baseline estimations. Rainfall variation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Most people can be trusted 
Careful in dealing with 
people 
          
Log Rainfall variation (100mm) 0.123* -0.00292 -0.177 -0.306 
 
(0.0635) (0.0702) (0.188) (0.240) 
Minority -0.000723 -0.00154 0.00647 0.00281 
 
(0.00315) (0.00307) (0.00593) (0.00496) 
Age of head 0.00140 0.00188 -0.00594 -0.00239 
 
(0.00272) (0.00273) (0.00519) (0.00417) 
Age of head, square/100 0.000888 0.00105 0.00616 0.00447 
 
(0.00165) (0.00159) (0.00463) (0.00447) 
Rural -0.00456 -0.00727 -0.0200 -0.0429 
 
(0.0238) (0.0234) (0.0400) (0.0384) 
Year of schooling of head 0.0440* 0.0313 0.00550 0.0191 
 
(0.0258) (0.0250) (0.0356) (0.0336) 
Male 0.174*** 0.129* 0.122 0.0977 
 
(0.0540) (0.0662) (0.0774) (0.105) 
Married -0.0294 -0.0412 -0.114* -0.0584 
 
(0.0277) (0.0308) (0.0682) (0.0517) 
Log Household income -0.0245** -0.0167 0.0151 0.0155 
 
(0.00944) (0.0105) (0.0158) (0.0168) 
Occupational fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Provincial fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 2,189 2,189 1,820 1,820 
Number of district clusters 126 126 123 123 
R-squared 0.026 0.103 0.027 0.261 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 7. Baseline estimations. Temperature variation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Most people can be 
trusted 
Careful in dealing with 
people 
          
Log Temperature variation (oC) 0.0721*** 0.0569*** -0.0652 -0.128*** 
 
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0528) (0.0445) 
Minority -0.000684 -0.00139 0.00625 0.00267 
 
(0.00318) (0.00307) (0.00607) (0.00483) 
Age of head 0.00127 0.00170 -0.00561 -0.00189 
 
(0.00273) (0.00271) (0.00536) (0.00410) 
Age of head, square/100 3.70e-05 0.000796 0.00723 0.00606 
 
(0.00170) (0.00160) (0.00492) (0.00508) 
Rural 0.00960 0.00160 -0.0331 -0.0701* 
 
(0.0233) (0.0240) (0.0401) (0.0365) 
Year of schooling of head 0.0334 0.0258 0.0135 0.0373 
 
(0.0252) (0.0250) (0.0362) (0.0335) 
Male 0.165*** 0.135** 0.119 0.0929 
 
(0.0512) (0.0675) (0.0823) (0.105) 
Married  -0.0352 -0.0263 -0.110* -0.0812* 
 
(0.0276) (0.0321) (0.0660) (0.0472) 
Household Income (mil.) -0.0251** -0.0170 0.0171 0.0178 
 
(0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0160) (0.0173) 
Occupational fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Provincial fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 2,189 2,189 1,820 1,820 
Number of district clusters 126 126 123 123 
R-squared 0.038 0.11 0.027 0.265 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 8. Climate variation and social trust. Adding geographic variables 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall Variation  Log Temperature Variation 
          
Climate variation 0.207* -0.884**  0.0598*** -0.178*** 
 
(0.106) (0.375)  (0.0188) (0.0636) 
Minority -0.00155 0.00203  -0.00166 0.00291 
 
(0.00312) (0.00489)  (0.00315) (0.00467) 
Age of head 0.00186 -0.00171  0.00191 -0.00233 
 
(0.00279) (0.00408)  (0.00280) (0.00389) 
Age of head, square/100 0.000907 0.00528  0.000969 0.00487 
 
(0.00166) (0.00444)  (0.00168) (0.00436) 
Rural -0.00710 -0.0428  0.000466 -0.0619 
 
(0.0236) (0.0403)  (0.0240) (0.0374) 
Year of schooling of head 0.0312 0.0182  0.0267 0.0296 
 
(0.0250) (0.0341)  (0.0250) (0.0323) 
Gender (Male:=1) 0.132** 0.0955  0.139** 0.0755 
 
(0.0648) (0.103)  (0.0655) (0.117) 
Married -0.0294 -0.0884  -0.0263 -0.0738 
 
(0.0326) (0.0568)  (0.0326) (0.0499) 
Log Household income  -0.0164 0.0153  -0.0161 0.0144 
 
(0.0107) (0.0173)  (0.0108) (0.0166) 
Average Rainfall (mm) -0.00136** 0.00369*  0.000177 -0.00237 
 
(0.000645) (0.00194)  (0.000414) (0.00179) 
Average Temperature (oC) -0.0116 0.0301  0.00525 -0.0340 
 
(0.00977) (0.0200)  (0.00746) (0.0254) 
Area of Land (1000m2) -0.00155 0.00457  -0.00165 0.00527 
 
(0.00499) (0.00461)  (0.00500) (0.00451) 
Land terrain (Flat:=1) 0.00527 0.0556  0.000403 0.0783* 
 
(0.0194) (0.0424)  (0.0199) (0.0429) 
Land quality 0.0127 -0.0405  0.0190 -0.0631 
 
(0.0223) (0.0643)  (0.0229) (0.0667) 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,189 1,820  2,189 1,820 
Number of district clusters 126 123  126 123 
R-squared 0.107 0.271  0.111 0.277 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 9. Climate variation and social trust. Adding other social network variables 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall Variation  Log Temperature Variation 
          
Climate variation 0.195* -0.809**  0.0547*** -0.141*** 
 
(0.114) (0.330)  (0.0192) (0.0439) 
Minority -0.00359 0.00548  -0.00352 0.00537 
 
(0.00376) (0.00555)  (0.00380) (0.00530) 
Age of head 0.00288 -0.00540  0.00283 -0.00529 
 
(0.00325) (0.00462)  (0.00328) (0.00443) 
Age of head, square/100 0.000169 0.00254  0.000236 0.00199 
 
(0.00162) (0.00453)  (0.00162) (0.00451) 
Rural -0.0234 -0.0424  -0.0129 -0.0692* 
 
(0.0210) (0.0434)  (0.0211) (0.0400) 
Year of schooling of head 0.0556* 0.0264  0.0494* 0.0420 
 
(0.0281) (0.0405)  (0.0282) (0.0376) 
Gender (Male:=1) 0.121 0.115  0.128 0.0968 
 
(0.0794) (0.115)  (0.0802) (0.126) 
Married -0.136 -0.103  -0.135 -0.0979 
 
(0.0866) (0.102)  (0.0868) (0.0947) 
Log Household income  -0.0152 0.0109  -0.0157 0.0125 
 
(0.0127) (0.0162)  (0.0129) (0.0156) 
Average Rainfall (mm) -0.00129* 0.00431**  0.000175 -0.00112 
 
(0.000691) (0.00191)  (0.000448) (0.00106) 
Average Temperature (oC) -0.0101 0.0378**  0.00583 -0.0191 
 
(0.00947) (0.0189)  (0.00737) (0.0166) 
Area of Land (1000m2) -0.00429 0.00189  -0.00440 0.00323 
 
(0.00738) (0.00598)  (0.00736) (0.00573) 
Land terrain (Flat:=1) -0.00277 0.0456  -0.00716 0.0660 
 
(0.0204) (0.0438)  (0.0205) (0.0462) 
Land quality 0.0324 -0.0530  0.0382* -0.0718 
 
(0.0218) (0.0739)  (0.0218) (0.0784) 
Always attending meeting -0.0118 0.0134  -0.0108 0.0142 
 
(0.0108) (0.0155)  (0.0108) (0.0141) 
Religious member indicator -0.300** 0.0147  -0.299** 0.0233 
 
(0.139) (0.0932)  (0.140) (0.0963) 
Hours watching TV -0.00839 -0.0301  -0.00697 -0.0326 
 
(0.0200) (0.0400)  (0.0196) (0.0386) 
Share of minority at commune 0.133 0.0144  0.135 0.0349 
 
(0.0929) (0.121)  (0.0922) (0.121) 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,738 1,431  1,738 1,431 
Number of district clusters 123 120  123 120 
R-squared 0.167 0.293  0.17 0.294 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 10. Climate variation and social trust by female  
  Female 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (oC) 
          
Climate variation 0.163 -0.723  0.0583 -0.192*** 
 
(0.199) (0.494)  (0.0404) (0.0674) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographical control Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 287 230  287 230 
Number of district clusters 83 73  83 73 
R-squared 0.352 0.398  0.355 0.415 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
 
Table 11. Climate variation and social trust by male 
  Male 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (oC) 
          
Climate variation 0.206* -0.534*  0.047** -0.101* 
 
(0.112) (0.316)  (0.0185) (0.0523) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographical controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,458 1,207  1,458 1,207 
Number of district clusters 124 122  124 122 
R-squared 0.155 0.374  0.157 0.374 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 12. Climate variation and social trust by regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent variable: Most people can be trusted 
VARIABLES 
Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (100mm) 
  
          
Climate variation  0.275* 0.218* 0.205* 0.321* 0.113  0.068*** 0.06*** 0.0508** 0.0596** 0.0556*** 
 
(0.142) (0.114) (0.115) (0.169) (0.139)  (0.0244) (0.0178) (0.0199) (0.0253) (0.0198) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,505 1,618 1,605 1,011 1,241  1,505 1,618 1,605 1,011 1,241 
Number of district clusters 111 104 100 79 102  111 104 100 79 102 
R-square 0.152 0.136 0.164 0.219 0.165  0.155 0.140 0.165 0.219 0.170 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round 
brackets.  
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Table 13. Climate variation and social trust by regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent variable: Careful in dealing with people 
VARIABLES 
Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (100mm) 
  
          
Climate variation  -0.744** -0.838*** -0.633* -0.132 -0.438  -0.167*** -0.0721 -0.128*** -0.114* -0.125*** 
 
(0.368) (0.318) (0.328) (0.379) (0.386)  (0.0486) (0.0498) (0.0447) (0.0645) (0.0432) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,261 1,301 1,317 882 987  1,261 1,301 1,317 882 987 
Number of district clusters 110 98 102 79 99  110 98 102 79 99 
R-square 0.404 0.375 0.367 0.363 0.246  0.407 0.365 0.369 0.367 0.256 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round 
brackets.  
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Table 14. Identifying impact channels: Village relationship 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dependent Variable: Borrowing from relatives 
VARIABLES 
Full 
sample 
Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded  
MRD and SCC 
Excluded  
SCC and CH 
Excluded  
SCC, CH, MRD 
  Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  0.162 0.357 0.391* 0.385* 0.426* 
 
(0.221) (0.220) (0.230) (0.213) (0.220) 
Share of Agricultural income 0.130** 0.124** 0.150** 0.122* 0.153** 
 
(0.0523) (0.0610) (0.0650) (0.0679) (0.0740) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,613 1,365 1,228 1,239 1,102 
Number of clusters 123 110 87 90 67 
R-square 0.122 0.137 0.145 0.145 0.156 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
 
Table 15. Identifying impact channels: Family ties 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dependent Variable: Borrowing from same villages 
VARIABLES Full sample 
Same 
village 
Exclude 
SCC 
Excluded  
MRD and SCC 
Excluded  
CH and SCC 
  
    
Log Rainfall variation 
(100mm)  0.310 0.228 0.318 0.307 0.277 
 
(0.269) (0.262) (0.321) (0.276) (0.271) 
Share of Agricultural income -0.111* -0.0561 -0.117* -0.0894 -0.116* 
 
(0.0603) (0.0766) (0.0647) (0.0644) (0.0628) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,613 1,160 1,365 1,487 1,476 
Number of district clusters 123 118 110 103 100 
R-square 0.127 0.167 0.131 0.134 0.128 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided  
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 16. Identifying impact channels: Agricultural incomes 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation   Log Temperature variation  
          
Climate variation 0. 206* -0.818**  0.05*** -0.136*** 
 
(0.115) (0.33)  (0.02) (0.044) 
Share of Agricultural 
income 0.051** 0.041 
 
0.055* 0.03 
 
(0.03) (0.043)  (0.03) (0.04) 
Share of  non-agricultural 
income -0.05 0.126* 
 
-0.04 0.105 
 
(0.036) (0.07)  (0.036) (0.07) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,738 1,431  1,738 1,431 
Number of district clusters 123 120  123 120 
R-squared 0.171 0.297  0.174 0.296 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Appendix II 
1. Social Trust and Climate variation. Rainfall and Temperature regression 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Rainfall variation   Temperature variation 
          
Climate variation 0.00118 -0.00467**  0.0230*** -0.0550*** 
 
(0.000728) (0.00218)  (0.00703) (0.0170) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,738 1,431  1,738 1,431 
Number of clusters 123 120  123 120 
Pseudo R-squared 0.166 0.171  0.290 0.294 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
 
2. Social Trust and Climate variation. Logistic regression 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation   Log Temperature variation 
          
Climate variation 3.284 -5.89***  1.29*** -1.023*** 
 
(2.603) (2.227)  (0.48) (0.305) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,659 1,424  1,659 1,424 
Number of clusters 123 120  123 120 
Pseudo R-squared 0.146 0.237  0.160 0.236 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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3. Using selection on observables to assess the bias from unobservables 
  
 
(1) (2)  (1) (2) 
  
Log Rainfall variation  Log Temperature Variation 
Controls in the restricted regression Controls in the full regression 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
             
Average Rainfall and Temperature Full set of controls from Table 8 23.10 21.23  40.95 53.27 
Average Rainfall and Temperature Full set of controls from Table 9  315.36 36.66  12.08 8.00 
Average Rainfall and Temp, Age, 
Age square/100, Gender, Married Full set of controls from Table 8 29.67 23.24 
 
76.92 17685 
Average Rainfall and Temp, Age, 
Age square/100, Gender, Married Full set of controls from Table 9  94.67 40.66 
 
10.30 10.18 
Notes: Each cell of the table reports ratios based on the coefficient for log rainfall and temperature variation from household-level regressions. In 
each regression, provincial fixed effects are included. The reported ratio is calculated as: the coefficient for log climate variation in full 
regression/(the coefficient for climate variation in restricted regression - the coefficient for climate variation in full regression) 
